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FOREWORD
This report presents the results of 8 study of spacecraft on-orblt
anoaalles and llfetlues. The basic source of Infornatlon is an update of a
data bank of on-orblt spacecraft rellabillty data coupiled by Plannlng Research
Corporation (PRC) for the Nstlonal Aeronautlcs and Space Admlnlstratlon and the
Navy Space Systeas Activity in a series of short tern contracts startln E in
1966. The update covers spacecraft operating since 1977 under the coEnlzance
of the Goddard Space FlIEht Center and the Jet Propulslon Laboratory.
Emphasis in this study is on Indlvldual spacecraft and their postlaunch
perforuance degradation over tlne as a function of couponent failures and
other incidents of anomalous behavior. By contrast, earlier studies in this
series concentrated on compillng reUabillty statistics for hardware eleuents
across spacecraft.
The I_ASATechnlcal Monitor for this study was Mr. Edward Shockey
of the Goddard Space F11ght Center, Code 302. The work was performed during
the period June 1982 throuEh January 1983, under NASA Contract NAS 5-27279.
The authors of this report are Charles E. Boomqulst and
Wlnlfred C. Graham. Other mesbers of the PRC study teas were Patrlcla Alverson
and Vers Little. Library assistance was provided by Wendy Chrlstensen and
report production support by Brenda I_ealy.
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ABSTRACT
Analyses of the on-orblt performance cf forty-four unmanned
NASA spacecraft operaClng in the past five years (1977-1982) ere presented.
Included are detailed descrlpclons and classlflcaClons of over 600
enomalles - each anomalous incident represents one reported deviation
from expected spacecraft perfora_nce. Charts deplcclng saCe111ce llfe-
tiles and the performance of thelr major subsystems are Included.
Engineering analyses to further InvesClgste the kinds and frequencies
of various classes of anomalles have been conducted. An improved method
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I. INTRODUCTIOH
This study has exaltned the orbital performance records of
forty-four unmanned spacecraft under the cognizance of the Goddard Space
711ght Center and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. Particular attention
has been given to each recorded incident of anomalous behavior. These
incidents, referred to herein as anomalies, range from momentary "glltches"
in otherwise normal spacecraft operation to complete spacecraft failure.
The basic data have been collected, reduced, analyzed and reported in
formats consistent with those in the existing data bank, developed by
Planning ksesrch Corporation (PRC). The_e earlier data were collected on
350 spacecraft under several discrete contracts awarded to PRC between
1966 and 1979.
A. Study ObJectlvem and Scope
One of N&SA's primary concerns is to improve the performance
of its spacecraft, both manned and unmanned. For unmanned spacecraft,
longevity is a key parameter. Generic approaches to improving longevity
are of continuing interest to NAS&; the search for such approaches is the
motivation for this study. There are two study objectives. The first is
to establish a current data base of on-orblt spacecraft anomalies and per-
formance summaries followlng previous PRC work in this area but extending
it somewhat to support the second study objective. The second objective
Is to develop s method for quantifying spacecraft performance as a function
of tim+ on orbit which extends and improves upon an existing methodology,
previously developed by PRC and applied to other spacecraft In the data bank.
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Aug_ntation of the data base is limited to spacecraft Launched
under the auspices of the God(lard Space Flight Center (GSFC) or the Jet
Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) and which have been operational since the last
general update of the space data bank in 1977-1978.
B. hcksround
The first 15 references at the end of this report trace the
compltlstton and utIltsstlon of the PRC d_ta bank, Reference I yes the
result of an initial study undertaken in 1966 to respond to the need for
w)re accurate and detslled spacecraft reliability date than were available
in the mld-slxtles. On-orblt data fros 225 spacecraft were compiled and
analyzed. The resultant report was well received and widely distributed.
Subsequently, several specific analyses of these data were conducted and
reported on (see References 2-6). Reference 7 yes an extensive update of
Reference I; the size of the data base essentiatly doubled. Reference 9
added still more data resulting from a modest collection effort in 1972.
References 8 and i0 through 14 reported on various speclal-purpose analyses
of the data bank. Reference 15 reported on another comprehensive update
and consolidation of the data bank conducted in 1978. At the conclusion
of that study, the PRC data bank included on-orblt performance data on
some 350 different spacecraft, k11 basic spacecraft data collected from
the beginning of these efforts were included tn the Reference 15 study
report. Reference 16 analyzed and interpreted orbltsl rellabtltty data
for U.S. wteorologtcsl sate111tes in the data bank.
C. Organizstton of the ___._
Section II briefly describes the data base and the updating of
it for purposes of this study. It includes a description of collection
and reduction procedures and baseline data on all spacecraft included in
the update. Section III classifies the anomaly data. First, the categories
established in the earlier efforts are utilized. They are reported
separately for purposes of consistency. Then, added classifications
developed specifically for this study are applied and reported. Section
IV presents perfor_nce summaries by spacecraft and by major subsystems.
It also provides en_lneering analyses of the anomaly data regarding
trends, persistent problem areas, test-related anomalies and other areas
of interest. Section V treats the question of seaeuring on-orbit space-
craft capability over time. It Includes consideration of the effect of
anomalies on (1) the basic spacecraft, (2) its scientific or applications
payload, and (3) its overall mission objectives. A methodology for
possible future application is su_:gested. Three appendices provide (l)
an indication of the adequacy of the data base coverage for this update,
(2) basic anomaly da_a tabulations including anomaly codes for purposes
of classification, and (3) detailed spacecraft and subsystem performance
suuartes in graphical form.
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II. DATABASE
This report documents a contlnutng examination of spacecraft
on-orblt reliability that PRC began in 1966. Four earlier studies collected
and analyzed data on 350 spacecraft from 52 space programs. Results from
these four studies are integrated and reported in Reference 15.
This present study is a contractually limited update to Reference
15. It covers only GSFC and 5PL spacecraft which were operational between
1977 and 1982. Several of the analyses integral to the earller studies ate
missing here, notably those relating to failure rates and probabilitles of
failure durln8 launch. Furthermore, no systematic effort has been devoted
to reporting the total_ty of the earlier data here or to relating the
earlier study results to those found In this update. Selected comparlsons
have been _de, but _f the reader is Interested in the entlre collection of
data and information contained in the PRC space data bank it is necessary to
have both Reference 15 and this report.
A. General
In addition to the publlshed reports, an unpubllshed file of englneerlng
analysls reports (EARs) are maintained for each spacecraft in the data base.
The ERAs are maintained at NASA and at PRC. (1)
The EAP,s are the basic data collectlon. They contain:
• General descriptive and operatlonal data on each spacecraft.
• A detailed breakdown of the spacecraft assemblies, components,
and piece parts.
(1)The NASA contact is Edward Shockey, GSFC Code 302, Telephone (301)
344-5628. The PRC contact is Charles Bloou_quist, PRC Systems Services,
10960 Wilshtre Boulevard, Suite 2320, Los Angeles, California 90024.
Telephone (213) 477-8278.
$
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• Operating (and donumt) time accumulated by each hardware
element.
• Descriptions of all anomalles and fallures recorded against
the spacecraft, to•ether wlth informatlon on the known or
probable causes of many anomalies.
• Background information regarding manufacture, test, and launch.
The Informatlon contained in each FAR, as sum_arlzed above, is
organized into three categories, namely, (1) general information, (2) r¢llabillty
data, and (3) development and prelaunch Information. C_neral information include_-
launch data, launch vehlcle, launch site, intended _sslon, orbltal parameters,
spacecraft description, and a general performance assessment over the time
period covered by the data bank.
The reliability data elements, to the extent possible, break the
spacecraft down into i_.s major components (receivezs, tape recorders, digital
decoders, etc.), accumulate the survival hour• in space for each (including
length of time on standby and number of times cycled),give in a further
breakdown the piece parts in each component, and finally, provide a rather
detailed description of each anomaly recorded during the mission.
Development and prelaunch in:ormation includes, as available,
the prelaunch test and checkout routines and experience, and brief
descriptions of developmental testing, part selection procedures, and
quality assurance provisions.
The subject study is an exception in that it correlates specific
ano_lie• with particular •pacecraft; previously published reports an_
papers do not. This correlation is always possible, however, by returning
to the EARs.
The samedata collection and reduction procedures and reporting
formats are used in each study, including the currant one. This uniformity
allows ready combination of the data herein with any or all of the previous
data sets.
B. Update For This Study
Exhibit 1 depicts the five on-orblt reliabillty studies, includlng
the current one, in terms of the programs and numbers of spacecraft considered.
This update Includes 44 spacecraft from 19 programs. Nineteen of these
spacecraft were covered in the previous study and continued to operate into
this study period. As mentioned previously, access to the total data base
(62 programs, 375 spacecraft) requires both this document and Reference 15
since previous data are not, for the most part, repeated here.
As in the previous studies, the basic data sources were the
Product Assurance Divisions at the NASA Centers (GSFC and JPL in this
1
study), cognizant spacecraft program offices, and open literature. Of
partlcular help in this update were the Mission Operations Managers for the
various Goddard programs.
The two major types of data sought for this study, as in earlier
studies, are: (i) an ehglneerlng report of the final design of the space-
craft, and (2) a flight analysis for individual spacecraft from which
operating histories and all known anomalous behaviors can be obtained.
From this information Engineering Analysis Reports (EARs) are generated for
each spacecraft. Tne EAR is tailored to provide the information content
required to meet the study objectives and provides a uniform base for each
spacecraft of the study.
1The EARs contain a complete llst of references used, by spacecraft. The
number of citations for this update is in excess of 250.
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!In the EARs the treatment of standby and redundant units is con-
ststent for all data samples and emphasizes the utilization of only knmm
values. Operational hours in the _ were recorded as "powered" end
"unpowered" where such information was kno_m. For much of the equipment.
however, the information available only Indicates thmt at • given tlme
the equipment was knob, s to be operational. For this reason the nominal
unit of measure In this report is survival time.
The authors believe that the crux of studies of this nature is
the provision of a large amount of data in a readily usable form. For
thls reason, as well as the fact that the information from the documentation
does not warrant application of highly sophistlcsted techniques, the methods
of analysis are simple and straightforward.
Classlficatlon and suaDarizatlon, using simple, readable tables, are
the primary presentation techniques. In general, statistical inferences are
not drawn froa these efforts. Conclusions have been drawn where appropriate.
but the emphasis is placed on presenting date in such a form that readers
may easily draw their own conclusions in areas of their special interest.
Documentation for the spacecraft in thls study was generally of
sufficient detail and of high quality. Appendix A indicates the quality
of data bank coverage for etch spacecraft In the updnte as a function of
the four major tables in the Engineering Analysis Reports.
C. Baseline Data
Exhibit 2 provides s complete list of spacecraft in the update.
together with several key data element,. The first four Items. Np,,r,.-
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craft designation, launch date, spacecraft status and status date, are
self-explanatory. The next columm gives the design 1lie (1) and the
operating 1lie, calculated as the difference between launch and status
dates. If the spacecraft is still operatlonal this figure lap of course,
only tentative.
The next two columns attempt to place the Indlvldual spacecraft in
the context of the larger U.S. space program by giving brief synopses of its
herltage/maturlty and factors determining its relatlve complexlty. Atteupta
to tabulate such quantitative factors as pointing accuracy, voltage regulatlon,
data rates, etc., were unsuccessful in that for many spacecraft the requisite
data points were unavailable and the others required so many quallflcatlons
or explanatlons that the quantitative nature of the entry was effectlvely
obscured. Thus, our rellance on more qualltatlve factors.
The flnal colunm is our attempt, nevertheless, to quantify relatlve
complexlty. The numbers were read from Exhibit 3 which, in turn, represents
our best engineering Judgment of relative spacecraft complexlty. Exhibit 3
is the end result of an Iteratlve, assessment process designed to place ali
43 spacecraft in the update (which successfully attained orbit) in
relatlon to each other in terlns of complexlty. The most complex was then
assigned a complexlty rating of 100 and the least complex a rating of I0,
there being in our Judgment about an order of magnitude difference in
complcxlty between the SHE and the Voyagers.
(1)Spacecraft design llfe is a rather nebulous parameter. It sometlmes
is not specified at ell in the documentatlon avsllable to us; in other
cases multiple design lives are referenced. We have, therefore, selected
one design life for each spacecraft that seems most reasonable to us on
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EXHIBIT 3 - RELATIVE SPACECRAFT COMPLEXITY
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!III. ANOMALY CLASSIFICATIONS
Because of the large number of anomalous incidents in this sample
(and in previous samples) classlflcatlon and summarization procedures are
mandatory to extract readily useable information. From the relevant spacecraft
EARs, a sun_nary of each anomalous incident in this sample has been prepared.
The summary is found in Appendix B-1 in the same format as the corresponding
data for the earller comprehensive studies. Appendix B-I lists, by space-
craft, every anomalous incident recorded in the EARs subsequent to a
successful launch. Each anomalous incident contains the follosrlng information:
1. An anomaly index relatlng the incident, unambiguously,
to the information in the EAR.
2. Time the incident occurred. An entry of ¢ indicates that the
incident occurred between the end of countdown and the estab-
llshment of the initial orbit. An entry of indicates that
the anomaly cannot be pinpointed in time since it was
intermittent, gradual, or unknown... _I other entries are in
hours.
3. Three short statements giving a description of the incident,
its cause, and its effect on the mission as a vhole.
4. Any known corrective action taken to prevent occurrence of the
incident on future flights or to obviate its effect on the
flight under consideration.
5. Other clarifying remarks required to put the incident in the
proper context.
17
In addition to this summarization, t_o kinds of anomaly
classiflcatlons were accompllshed: (1) compilatlons by the
classlflcatlon codes used in all previous studies (the standard approach),
and (2) compilatlons by a set of additional classiflcatlon codes designed
to more fully descrXbe the characteristics of the observed anomalles.
Complete compilatlons are presented in Appendices B-2 and B-3, respectlvely,
in the same order and using the same anomaly index as the su_narles of
Appendix B-1. The two sets of classlficatlons and their results are
discussed in the followlng subsections.
A. The St,ndard Approach
In the standard approach, there are nine characteristics for which
each anomalous incident is coded. Some of the information needed to select
a particular code for a given entry may occur only in the EAR so that, in
a sense, the classification codes carry more information than that provided
in the entries of Appendix B-1. The complete standard approach coding of
each entry is given in Appendix B-2. Unsuccessful launchcs are not included
in these appendices.
Fxhiblt 4 defines the categories and codes for eight of the
classiflcstions used. The ninth classification, Subsystem Function is
defined in Subsection III.A.8 below. Definitions of the terms, the results of
classlfying t.he 6061 anomalies of thls study and the P,0961 anomalles of
Reference 15 are given in the following subsections.
These totals do not include unsuccessful launches.
18
EXHIBIT 4 - ANOMALOUS INCIDENT CLASSIFICATION CODES, STANDARD APP._OACH
I. Mission Subset
U. Unsuccessful Launch













2. Non-Negllgible but Small
3. 1/3 to 2/3 Mission Loss






a. Timing, Control and
Comand
b. Telemetry and Data
Randlln$
c. Power Supply


























Rouennumerals followtnS the paraaraDh headtns8 refer to the
ltc_an numerals In Exhibit 4.
I. H1ssion Subset (I)
Thls code simply Idtntifles the unsuccessful
launches (U) and those spacecraft for which there are no reported anom-
alies (S).
For this study, one of the 44 spacecraft launches (NOAA-B) was unsuc-
cessful; there were no spacecraft that experienced zero anomalies. The














Th_s Study Reference 15 This Study Reference 15
1 43 2.3 12.3
0 40 0 11.4
43 267 97.7 76.3
Htsston Term (II)
The code identifies long-term (L) or short-term
If a mission Is anticipated to be longer than 60 days it
All spacecraft in thls data sample are long-
2O
..7 - f
The breakdovn, by number of anomalles and percentages, is as
follows:
Number Percent
This Study Reference 15
Htssion Term
L. Long Term 606 1,695
S. Short Term 0 401
3. Mission Phase (IIl)
This Study Reference 15
100 80.9
0 19.1
A spacecraft mission can be thought of as consist-
ing of two distinct phases: launch and acquisition (L) and the orbital or
steady-state phase (0). An anomaly cccurring during launch and acquisition
is classified L; if it occurs during steady-state operation it is classi-
fied O. A third category, Q, is provided for those instances where the
dichotomy cannot be made due to insufficient information. The distinction
is made on the best Judgment available based on the engineering analysis
reports. Generally, those incidents indicating an ¢, or very few hours
of elapsed time at occurrence, are classified as L, all others as O.
The breakdown of anomalies occurring in each category and the
associated percentages is as follows:
Number Percent
This Study Reference 15
Misalon Phase
This Study Reference 15
L. Launch and 61 480 i0.i 22.9
Acquisition
O. Orbital 545 1,608 89.9 76.7
(Steady-State)
Q. Unknovn 0 8 0 0.4
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4. Hlsslon Effect (IV)
The five groups included in this classification
indicate the severity of the anomalous incident in terms of its effect on
the overall mission had it occurred in isolation. The definition of each
class 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 should be self-evident from the classification
names given in Exhibit 4 - Thus, in colu_ IV of the tables in Appendix B-2
all incidents coded 1 have essentially negligible effect on mission per-
formance; those coded 5 are essentially catastrophic to the mission. The
code U indicates there was insufficient information on which to assign a
mission effect code.




This Study Reference 15
Pe_ent
This Study Reference 15
1. Negligible 447 1,330 73.8 63.4
2. Non-Negligible 117 579 19.3 27.6
but Small














1 25 0.2 1.2
Spacecraf_ Subsystem (V)
Each anomalous incident is coded accordlnc to which
of eight major spacecraft subsystems Is most closely related to the Incident.
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An unkno_ catqory Is lncludtd for those cases vhere a reXetiomshtp does
not exist or cannot be determined frma the available lnfonm_ton. The
• ubsy•tms used for th/• clusificatton are nasnt to define broad func-
tiooal operations found to one extent or another in all spacecraft. The
functional definition for subsystems yes chosen rather thau 8 definition
based on hardvare for tvo reasons. First, subsystem defin/tions very
among orsJ_tzsttous and .leoul program offices of the same organization.
The data anaXysts requires s grouping that can be 8ppXled to alX spacecraft
of the coXlectlve data uaple. The second and more important reason for
uslnS a functional definition is that, in the predeslgn stages of fu'ure
programs, the program uanaganent viXX knov vhat functions the planned
spacecraft 18 expected to perform vlth more certainty than the actuaX
hardvare conflsurstlon that wIX1 be used to perform the desired functions.
The comparisons at the eubrystem XeveX as defined in thls report vouXd be
usefuX in the prede•IKn phase of program developuent. For exanple, one
vould be interested to knov, baaed on past experience of other programs,
vlth vhat certainty • spacecraft vouXd deploy Its structural eXements
(structure subsysten) or suppXy pover to the other planned functions Cpover
supt_ly subsystel). In the later stages of development of a projected pro-
gram, vhen ,,ore Is knovn 8bo_t the hardvare configuration, the interest
vouXd shift to the equipment group/component level of 8nsly818 vhlch is
hardvsre oriented.
The fo_-Xowtn8 list defines the subsystmt8 and indicates the types
of equipment that are considered to be a part of each 8ubsyetea.
a. TintnK. Control and Co_snd
Coem_nd receivers, decoder•, tiners, prosrmmers,









Telemetr 7 and Data HmldlinS
Encoder8, D/A converters, /_D cowrertere, tope
recorders, slsnal conditioners, telemetry trans-
altters, tracklng tranmaltters, antennas
Pover
_ttterie8, solar arrays, fuel cells, couvercers,
Inverters, regulators, protective devices, charge
regulators
Attitude Control and Stabilization
Cyros, spin control, magnetometers, sun aspect in-
dicators, eddy current dampers, horizon scanners,
st_ trackers, dymmlc control
Propulsion
Coding thls eubsysten_rLth a d* indicates that the
propuZsion subsysten considered here is more closely
related to the attitude control subsystem of the
spacecraft than to the launch vehicle. Included
are hydrazine thrusters, tanks, vaXven, etc.
Environmental Control
Both passive and active thermal control devices,
life support systan8, etc.
Structure
Basic s_ructure, booa8, solar paddles separation.
PayXodd (Experimental and Scientific)
Wide-band coumunlcations (for opacecraft vhere this
equipment was considered experinentel), utcrovsve
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!equilment (cavities, TWrs, etc., flown for assess-
sent purposes), unXvers£ty experiments, particle
detectors, mass spectrometers, plsema analysers,
infrared radloueCers, ,JXtravlolet radlosecers.
A1thoush It is felt that these sroupXngs are eesentla]ly self-
explanatory, check/us 8 few of the codes in Appendix B-2 with their cor-
responding entries in Appendix B-1 should dlspel confusion. This pro-
cedure is appllcable to lost of the other classlflcatlons as well.
The breakdotm, in tents of number of anomalies and their associ-
ated percentages, to each of the subsystem cstegorles is as follows:
Number Percent
This Study Reference 15 ThXs Study gefernece 15
Spacecraft Subsysten
a. Tining, Control 55 290 9.1 13.8
and Command
b. Telemetry and 116 599 19.1 28.6
Data Handllng
c. Power Supply 56 199 9.2 9.5
d. Attitude Control and 123 287 20.3 13.7
Stabilization
d_ Propulslon 26 62 4.3 2.9
e. Envirormental 16 36 2.6 1.7
Control
f. Structure 6 47 1.0 2.2
$. Payload 208 540 34.3 25.8
(Experimental and
Sclenclflc)
h. Unknown 0 36 0 1.7
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6. Incident Type (VI)
a. Incident Type (VI.A)
This classification places an anomaly in
one of four nutully exclusive Stoups: electrical (E), mechanical (14),
other (O), and unknown (U). Those entries in Appendix B coded with an E
in the VX.A colmun indicate that anomaZou8 behavior is exhibited bY elec-
trical or electronic parts, components, eubsyacels, or functions. Those
anomalies coded M are aLnLXarly defined for uechantcaX parts, couFonents,
£
subsystems, or functions. An 0 indicates behavior of equipment that cannot
be cXaasified eXectrical or mechanical: propellant desradatLon, for exam-
ple. A U indicates insufficient information to asslin the entr_ to any
of the other three categories.
The breskdmTn of anomalies and percentages in this c18sJlfLcation
sroup is as follows:
Number Percent
This Study Reference 15 This Study Reference 15
Incident Type
£. Electrical 329 1,538 54.3 73.4
N. Mechanical 64 192 10.6 9.2
O. Other 197 158 32.5 7.5
U. Unknovn 16 208 2.6 9.9
b. Incident Type (VI.B)
The classification of column VI.B in Appendix B
attempts to divide incidents into those that are pert related and those
that are non-part related. A code of C indicates those incidents arising
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from a catastrophic part failure. I An 0 ImIicates that the anomalous Inci-
dent is related to behavior of a part (or parts) that has not failed cat-
astrophically (degraded, intermittent, etc.). An N indicates an anomalous
incident not related to any part misbehavior. A U indicates that insuf-
ficient information exists to determine whether part behavior was InvoZved
or not.
The breakdown by number and percentage of anomalies for these care-
gories is as follows:
Incident Type
Number
This Study Reference 15
Percentase




An assignable cause is attributed to an anomalous incident if the
incident could have been prevented by taking some action well within the
1The tens "catastrophic" here is defined to mean "catastrophic" to the
part and not necessarily to the larger component system. Typical types of
catastrophic part failures include a transistor or diode shorting for no
known reason. This definition is consistent with that used in the negative








52 242 8.6 11.5
277 727 45.7 34.7
256 902 42.2 43.0
7. Incident Cause (VII)
Three broad groups are defined for incident cause
in column VIl of the tables in Appendix B: assignable causes (A), non-
assignable causes (N), and unknown (U).
C. Catastrophic 21 225 3.5 10.7
Part Failure
state-of=the-art prior to launch. Xf the incident could not have been
prevented In thts manner, tt Is c18sstfied nonasstjnahls (N). :f Insuf-
ficient information exists to musks 8 Judpsnt, the anomaly Is classified
u_mow (U).
The breakdown for Lhess catesorles is as folloes:
Number Percent
This Study Reference 15 This Study
lncldent Cause
Reference 15
A. Asslgnable 251 732 41.4 34.9
N. Non-Asslsnable 83 264 13.7 12.6
U. Unknob-n 272 1,100 44.9 52.5
Further discussion of the amsIsnable cstme catesory is siven In Subsection
Subsystem Function (VIII)




The assisnnent of anowtltes to the subsystems (character-
istic V) Is helpfuX in narrovlnS down the functlonal aspects of spacecraft
which are the most troublesome. A further step in this direction is Juscl-
fled to Isolate more precisely the locstlon of snotwlous incidents. To
do this 8 number of subfunctlons (characteristic Vlll) are defined for
each previously defined spacecraft subsystem. The subfunctlons for each
subsystem are defined so that they mrs mutually exclusive and exhaustive,
i.e., they do not overlap and they do cover the entire subsystem. In deter-
minims the quantities of the subfuncttons and their ss|ocistgd 8nomJliss, only
data that specifically identifies the 8ubfunction is considered. For instance.
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if the data clearly involve a command decodlns subfunction, Chert an asaLsn-
rant is made to that cate$ory. Each anomalous incident carries, therefore,
two codas relacln$ the incident to functional locatlon within the spacecraft.
The subsystems, subfunctlons, and codes used for each are tabulated in
_¢hlbics 5 and 6. Exhibit S gives the total number of functions in chls
saaple, the total number of anoaalLes observed, and the anomalies per function
for this study. Exhibit 6 presents the same information for data prevlousXy









5 - DETAILED CLASSIFICATION OF ANOMALOUSINCIDENTS BY SPACECRAFT































I. Data Point Sensing
and MonLtorlns 43 13 0.30
2. Signal Conditioning 8 1 0.12
3. Encoding, Fonnatttns 63 2 0.05
4. Data Storage 27 43 1.59
5. Trensmisslon 43 56 1.30
6. Unknown _ _ -





























































































































E_IlBIT 6- DETAILED CL_SIFICATION OF ANOMALOUS INCI_TS BY SPACECRAFT























































































































































































For this study several addl_lonal ways of treating the basic
anomaly data were considered. These included addltlonal treatment of
anomaly causes, anomaly type, history, test background, level of space-
craft breakdown giving rise to the anomaly, the heritage of anomalous
hardware, etc. Many of these considerations are reflected qualltatlvely in
the engineering analysis of Section IV.B. Quantltatlvely, four characteristics
were found to have sufficient information to provide additlonal useful
categorization. These are cause, type, testability, and source. Exhibit 7
defines the categories and codes for these additional classifications.
It also provides the number and percentage of the 606 anomalies assigned
to each category. Definitions of the terms and notes on classifying the
606 anomalles of this study are given in the following subsections.
Roman numerals followlng the paragraph headings refer to the Roman
numerals in Exhibit 7. A compZete tabulatlon of these codes, by anomaly,
is given it_ Appendi._ B-2.
1. Anomaly Cause (X)
Anomaly cause is treated in the standard approach but only
to the extent of determining if the anomaly has an assignable cause or
not. While the previous studies in this series further analyzed
the anomalles with assignable causes , no formal coding was reported. This
categorization remedies that situation and also defines a new set of "causes"
more in keeping with recent data. The first three categories all represent
design problems. The first, Space Environment, is invoked when the design
provides an inadequate response to the envlronmental stresses of space.
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_NIBIT 7- ANOHkLOUS INCIDENT CLASSIFICATION CODES, ADDED CBAI_CTmtISTICS
X. Anomaly Cause Number Percent
a. Space _nvirmment 56 9.2
b. On-Board Soft.are 21 3.5
c. I)esisn, Other 90 14.9
d. Quality Control/Nork_anshlp 25 4. I
•. Cont amtnat ion 21 3.5
f. Catastrophic Part Fallure 40 6.6
8. Catastrophic Circuit Failure 25 4.1
h. Cate_trophic Component Failure 28 4.6
i Catastrophic Black Box Failure 33 5.4
J UnknoTau 267 44.1
TOTAL 606 100.0
XI. Anomaly Type
S. Systematic 216 35.6
W. Wearout/Aglng/Depletlon 44 7.3
C. Chance 20 3.3
O. Glitch 52 8.6
U. Unknown 274 45.2
TOTAL 606 100.0
XlI. Testability
Y. Yes 95 15.7
N. No 90 14.9
M. Maybe 116 19.1
U. Unknown 305 50.3
TOTAL 606 100.0
XIII. Source
I. Part 68 11.2
2. Clrcuit/Sub_ssembly 66 10.9
3. Component 117 19.3
4. Black Box 97 16.0
5. Subsystem/Interface 15 2.5
6. Interaction 153 25.2
7. Unknown 90 14.9
TOTAL 606 100.0
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The second, On-Board Software, covers anomalous behavior attributable
to errors in software or to software which is inadequate for actual _eratfonal
procedures. The third category, Design, Other, covers all other anomalies
attributed to design deficiencies. &nomalies are categorized as Quality/
Workmanship if, and only if, the source documentation so specifies.
Thus, there may be more of these anomalies than appear in the Exhibit 7
tabulation. Contamination includes all reports of any kind of foreign
matter in or on the spacecraft hardware. Catastrophic fallure occurs
when a particular level of hardware (Part, Circuit, Component, Black Box)
fails completely for none of the previously listed causes. Parts are
single integrated circuits, valves, motors, etc. Circuits are actual
electrical circuits (oscillators, amplifiers, etc.) or small collections
of parts (gear assemblies, for example). Components are sets of "stand-alone"
hardware, typically: tape drives, power converters, gyro electronics. Black
_oxes are complete functional units, e.g., tape recorders, batteries, solar
arrays, or command decoders. The Unknown category is reserved for those
anomalies for which there is insufficient information to make any other
assignment.
2. Anomaly Type (XI)
The standard approach treats anomaly type in two dimensions.
The first distinguishes between electrical, mechanical, or other (chemical, etc.)
type of anomaly and the second the relationship of the anomaly to piece part
behavior. This categorization examines whether the anomalies are deterministic
or not. Thus, the category Systematic includes anomalies that would recur
If identical hardware were operated under identical conditions. Wearout,
Agln_, and Depletion are special cases of systematic anomalies and have been
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fbroken out separately. Two kinds of "random" anomalies have also been
Include_. The first, Chance, represents significant anomalies that would
not necessarily occur if identical hardware were operated muder Identical
conditions. These anomalles are almost always reported in the source
documentation as random failures. Glitches are also randomly occurlng
anomalies. They are usually insignificant in terms or mission effect,
occur at most a very few times then disappear requiring no corrective action
other than perhaps a co_mnd to restore vrover status. A_aln, nearly half
of the anomalies cannot be asslgned to the above categories.
3. Testability (XII)
This categorization answers the question, "Could prelaunch
testing have revealed the anomaly?" A 'Yes" was assign_.d if it was reasonably
clear that some type of testing would have produced the anomaly. A '_fes" was
not assigned ff the required testing was beyond a reasonable definition of
the state of the art or would have required testing of excessive duration.
A '_o" was assigned if no test would have a reasonable expectation of
producing the anomaly (a random part failure, for example). A "No" was
also assigned if a test could be conceived but was clearly impractical
(requiring zero gravity, for example) or would have been prohibitively
expensive. An assignment of "Maybe" covers the situation in ,_hich test
expense or sophistication Mile not clearly out of the question are
approaching that situation. This category is also assignned when a clear
distinction between "Yes" and "No" is not possible based on available data.
The "Uuknown" category represents the case where there is not enough
information available to _ke any other assignment.
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4. Source (XlII)
This classification has bean constructed to reveal wher_P
the anomalies originate. The first four cateltorias are simply harch_aro
items of increa¢ing levels of complexity. The hardware levela are defined
as in the Anomaly Cause clasaificaticm. In each caJ,e, the lo_mst applicable
level was asaigned that the available information would support. A few
anomalies could not be isolated below the Subsystem/Interface level. These
are mostly incorrect wiring harnesses. A much snore frequently occurring
source Is "Interact ion." This cover, all anomalies where incorrect responses
occur between groups of hardware or betv_,en the hardware and its operating
environment. Tvl, lcal anomalies in this _-ategor_' are wheel unloading _,dlen
the tape recordt, r stops. RFI. turn-on transients, and contaminatio, of one
st't of hardwnre due to outgasstng from av_,,th_.r. The. "Unk,o_m" _'ntegorv i,.:




For this study, two types of analyses of the basic anommly end
spacecraft survival dace were conducted. The first deals wILth spacecraft
and spacecraft subsystem performance over their observed llfetlses. The
second is sn engineering analysis of several speclel factors.
A. Performance Summaries
The performance of each spacecraft considered in thLs update
is indicated on a separate bar chart In Appendix C-I. The survlval time
for each subsystem (as defined in the documentatlon for that spacecraft)
is presented as are the survival times for all anommloug components.
Survival tlmes are also Indlcsted for the redundant units of anomalous
components whether or not they themselves had anomalies. Each and every
anoaoly Is charted at the time it occurred end against the component or
subsystem In which It occurred. A distinction is made on the charts
between failing components (totally unusable) and less serious anomalies.
For those spacecraft that were considered in previous studies,
all anomalies from launch have been included even though these anomalies
do not otherwlse form pert of the update data base. They are treated in
Reference 15.
A second set of charts indicates the performance of major
spacecraft subsystees. These are collected in Apendlx C-2. Since each
spacecraft has a somewhat different breakout of subsystems, we have
standardized on the eight defined in subsection II_.A._. Yor the major
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subsystems (_atng, Control and Coemand; Telenetry and Data KandlLng;
Power Supply; Attltude Control and Stabilization, and Payload) an entry is
made for each spacecraft vhether or not it had sisnlfLcant ano.Lslies in
the subject suh4ysteu. If it had significant anomalies, the anomalous
cc_aponents (and their redundant units, if any) are also listed. The
Structure subsystem does not appear since there were no significant
anomalies in this subsystem in this update. Since so few anomalies
occurred in the Propulsion and the Environuental CorLtrol subsystems, only
those spacecraft are listed which suffered significant anoaalles in these
areas.
In addition to being ordered by subsystea rather than space-
craft, this set of charts differs fron the spacecraft charts in two ways.
First, only "significant" anomalies are Included. These are generally
those categorized as having a mission effect code of 2 or greater (see
sub_ectlon III.A.4) although all anomalies in redundant units, vhose
alsslon effect is negligible because of the redundancy, are also included.
The second ssJor _ifference is that tt_, rather than being plotted in
hours, is plotted in units of spacecraft design Ills. Thus, an operating
time of 67 months for an AE-5 subsystcu is plotted as 67/12 = 5.6 since
its design llfe is one year (see Exhibit 2). Siu, ilsrly, an operating
tlue of 62 months for an ATS-6 subsystem is plotted as 62/24 = 2.6
since the ATS-6 design llfe is two years.
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S. l_aElneerlngAnJlysss
Engineering analyses were conducted to provide further insights
Into the nature of the •noaalies that have occurred on the setelHtss in
this update. The analyses covered seven areas ranging from persistent problsas
and test-related anoaalles to black box failures and RFX/EHI. Each of
the seven areas is discussed below In • separate subsection.
I. Persistent Probleas
In an earlier analysls of the data bank, tt was found that
over 80 percent of all anosalles fell into 30 categories of leadlng
problea areas (_eference 14). It was also noted that these categories
represented "persistent" problems in that the anomalies occurring on the
sore recently launched spacecraft were of the ease types as the anosalles
on earlier spacecraft. Since a significant aaount of new data were
collected on this data bank update, it was deemed deslrable to reexaaine
these persistency trends.
Once again it was found that spproxlaately 80 percent of the
anoaalles "fit" the 30 problea areas. Exhibit 8 depicts the rank order
of these problea areas for this update, for the 1978 update and for the pre-
1978 data bank. The three-part exhlbtt i11ustrates the persistency of the
problea areas over tlae as weLL as the shlfts in their ranks.
A nuaber of interesting obeervatlons can be --de froa the
exhibit. For exaaple, as ttae passes fewer problea areas account for 50
percent of the anomalies. This laplles that by addressing the five upper-
ranking probLes areas in this update one would In fact be addressing forty
percent of the observed anosaHes. Xn the pre-1978 era, nine probless
would have had to be addressed to achleve slallar coverage.
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The r•nk of tape recorders as • problma •re• has dropped steadily frms the
first ssaple to the last uhtle re--inlng • significant probleu ares.
Note that thls drop in rank could -'an either that tap@ recorders are
gntting better or other problem, are gntttng worse. EFI/E_I also
continues to be • algnlflcant problem.
Ch_Ltcal propulsion now ranks second only to aclentlfic Instruments
as • problea •re•. It's ranking in the pre-1978 saaple was 15 and in the 1978
sample it was 5. Part of the re•son for _he rank Increase in thls study
is the large nunber of propulsion problew on ATS-6. However, many other
spacecraft suffered frol I to 3 propulsion problens, indicating that anomalous
behavior in chemical propulsion systeas Is a general and increasingly severe
problea. Another Intersstlng increase is observed in the gyro category.
The ranks •re 23, 23, 8 fron the earliest to the uost recant saaple.
This is due in part to several gyro probleus on IUE, TIROS-N, and NOAA-6
but •gain it seems to be a sore general problem as well and a definite
cause for concern.
The RY Tel•Retry category ranking dropped fro• 7 to 11 to 16
in the most recent saaple. A saJor reason for this Is that spacecraft
now rely extensively on S-bend equlpment for telemetry, and S-band
anos_lles are included in the Widabend cstegorles.
2. Test-Related AnoLslias
&non•lies in the update sample were classified eccordtn_
to whether they might have been eliaLnsted through some type of testing
(See Section III,B). Anoasltes known to be related in some fashion to
the testing progrmn were also identified. Twenty seven such anommliss
were found and although there ere undoubtedly others, specific lnfot_atton
is available only for these 27.
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Seven anolalous incidents were reported that were kno_m
to exist as enosu|2ies prior to launcho One typical anoslly of this type
Involved • memory halt on LA_DSAT-3 vhen an S-bend tiler reset was comemnded.
This abnormal response had occurred occaslonally prior to launch.
On SEAS&T, a 21 C_Iz electrical temperature monitor vas reported as failed
prior to launch, then returned to normal operation, but failed qaln
about 300 hour_ into the mission. Another typical anomaly Involves
payload data interference over the South Atlantic Anomaly on NIMBUS-7;
this was expected due to the type of data channel detectors utltized.
Ten anomalies were of a type noted prior to launch but
not then considered to be an anomaly. For instance, on NOAA-6 • ceramic
capacitor had been identified as a problem component before launch, and
was replaced with speclally screened items. Nevertheless, problems with
this capacitor recurred and caused significant losses of instrument data.
In another case, s tape recorder on SHE did not respond to playback
commands when the unit was cold; symptoms of this anomaly had been noted
in prelaunch tests
Two anomalies -- both on NIMBUS 7 -- _ere specifically reported
as having not been revealed in testing. One of these involved Interference
with the scanning of one instrument by the scanning of another Instrument.
It was reported that this was possibly due to structural resonance or
structural transa/sslon, and that the test fixture could have masked
structural effects. The other anomaly of this kind involved unexpectedly
high temperatures of the cooler door and cone on the Coastal Zone Color
Scanner. It wss reported that this possibly occurred because of hlsher
earth slbedo in orbit than was simulated in thermal-vacuum testing.
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Four anomalies existed prior to launch but went undetected,
Includlng a wlrlng error in a thruster control harness on AE-5.
Wour anomalles were reported that involved settlngs or procedures based on
test data that ware later found to be inadequate. For instance, on
Vlklng Lander 2 battery temperatures increased significantly higher
than predicted. _t was reported that the teaperature predictive model
was based on data from preproductlon, prototype batteries rather than
fllght batteries, and was in error.
3. Environmental Effects
Of the 606 update anoualles, 56 (or sllghtly over 9 percent)
were caused by some type of envlron_ental effect. Since chls Is a rather
significant proportion of the anomalies, and particularly slnca many of
these anoaalles could possibly have been prevented by sore adequate design
or testing provlslous, the anomalies ware further Investlgated In terse of
hardware and functional areas.
In thls investigation, envlronuental effects were broadly
defined as those orlglnstlng external to the spacecraft itself. It was
found that ten categorles encompassed these effects:
(1) Effects of orbit: Deteralned by orbital characteristics
such as eclipse and solstice, sun ankle, day/nlght and
nlght/day transitions, orbital location, etc.
(2) Temperature effects: Created by the space therwl








Resulted frol the sun's visible spectrum.





Associated with the atmospheric
(6) Effects of vacuum: Associated with the space vacuum.
(7) Earth effects: Resulted from albedo and the earth's
magnetic field.
Radiation effects: Associated with space radiation.
Effects of launch: Created by the launch environwnt.
Other: Environmental effects not encompassed by the
other categories.
From the above, it can be seen that "overlap" between the categories
For instance, an excessive spacecraft temperature might be due to
either the space thermal environment or the sun angle as determined by the space-
craft's orbital characteristics. In assigning anomalies to the environment&l
effects categories in this investigation, such possible overlaps were handled by
basing the assign_ent on the primary environmental effect leading to the
the anomaly as given in the data. That is, if the primary cause of space-
craft ov_rheating was the sun angle, the anomaly was assigned to the orbital
effects category rather than the temperature effects category. It is felt
that assigning the anomalies in this manner provides a clearer indication
of where more emphasis would be warranted during design and test.
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Exhibit 9 depicts in utrix format the dLstribution of anomalies
by hardware/functional area end the various envtronmntal effects leading
to them. Typical exaaples of anomalies assisned to each category are as
follows:
(I) In the "Effects of Orblc" category, anoaaltes include the
GOES-4 loss of RF po_er from a UHF transaltter pre- and
post-eclipse, and the MAGSAT anolaly Involvlug sun inter-
ference in the star camera in the Southern hemisphere.
Another exaaple is the array "notching" that occurred on
NIMBUS-7 st nlght/dey transitions.
(2) In the "Teaperature Effects" category, anosalles include
the deploysent problem on SAGE attributed to a stiff cable
due to low temperature. Also, the ATS-6 parabolic reflector
antenna anomaly consistlng of distortions due to diurnal
thermal gradients was assigned to thl8 category.
(3) In the "Sun Effects" category, three of the anomalies involve
abnormal operation of horizon scanners/earth sensors due to
sun interference (SAGE, NOAA-7 and SEASAT). Thls category
also includes erratic operation of NIMBUS-7 sun sensor at
some SUn ar_le8,
(h) All of the anomalies attributed to "Moon Effects" are
associated vlth lunar tlluudnstlon. Twice it interfered
wlth earth sensor operation (C_)ES-3 and TIROS-M); it also





















(5) At least two of the anomalles designated "Atmospheric
Noise" were associated with the South Atlantic Anomaly;
when the respective spacecraft were over this location,
RFI caused a clock Juap on SMMand interfered with a
payload Instrument on NIMBUS-7. LANDSAT-3 also experi-
enced RFI over magnetlc anomalles, although the data does
not specify which ones. Klso assigned to this category
was a TIROS-N anomaly Involvlng spurious command _erlfi-
cations; this was attributed to the receiver's frequency
being in the neighborhood of anmteur radio and television
traffic.
(6) Two of the anomalies assigned to "Effects of Vacuum" were
caused by outgasslng (IANDSAT 3 and Voyager 2). A third
anomaly -- the star tracker on Voyager 2 tracking bright
particles Just after launch -- was also Judged to be due
to outgasslng.
(7) In the "Earth Effects" category, one of the anomalies
includes a spectrometer on SHE breaklng-liuLtts due to the
effects of a "bright earth." On SEAS&T, a horizon scanner
tracked cold clouds, and on SNNearth albedo entered a
sun sensor's field of view.
(8) "gadfatlon Effects" includes three instances of array daaage,
one due to a large solar flare (ATS-6) and two due to
the same large solar particle event (GOES-4 and GOES-5).
Three other anomalies involve Jovian radiation effects
on the Voyagers. Also, a radiation "hit" on DE-1 wiped




Three anomalies were caused by the "Effects of Launch'.
On MAGSAT, there were indications that a thermal panel
came off during launch. On TIROS-N, p_opulslon problems
were attributed to a nut relaxing due to launch shock.
On Voyager 2, a computer became "confused" by the high
boost rates and issued commands to counteract them.
Four anomalies were assigned to the "Other" category.
On ATS-6, intermittent array thermistor operstion was
attributed cryptically to "the long term effects of
cycllng In orbit." The detector window of a sclenttflc
instrument on ISEE-3 was punctured by a mlcrometeorlte.
NOAA-7 experienced higher solar pressure torques than
expected, and the Viking Orbiter 1 experienced a strong




4. Black Box Failures
As is evident from discussions elsewhere in this report,
a large number of data bank anomalies involve intermittents (some of which
"go away"), degraded performance that does not significantly impact the
mission, or other types of anomalous behaviors that do not render the
associated hardware useless. It seemed, therefore, that it would be of
interest to identify and tabulete the anomalies where a significant piece
of hardware became useless due to some type of problem.
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These "sLEnlflc5nt pieces of hardware" are referred to herein
as "black boxes," and include batteries, tape recorders, EY roe, recelvers,
radiometers, and the llke. The black boxes are generally elements of the
basic spacecraft subsystems; experiments _re specifically excluded from
consideration in this analysis.
The data were then searched to identify those anomalies associated
with the failures of black boxes. The definition of "failure" was that the
black box was rendered useless by the anomaly. In some cases, this implies
that the black box ceased to function; in others that the anomaly caused
such degraded or erratic operation that the black box ,:ould not provide
its intended function.
In the update sample, 65 such black box failures were found
representlnE approxlmately lIZ of all anomalies. The failures occurred
on 17 types of black boxes. These data are depicted in Exhibit I0.
The quantities shown in the left-most colum_ indicate the number
of black box failures where redundancy was both provided and operable. In
the next column, the number of failures shown are those where redundancy
was provided but had previously failed The next column indicates the
,umber of failures where no redundancy had been nrovlded.
yor batteries, only the total number of failures is shown; that
is, the failures are not broken down to indic, te redundancy provisions. This
was done because b_Lteries are seldom truly redundant since a remaining
battery can carry only some portion of the load that could he handled by
the original, non-failed complement of batteries.
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In the update sample, there sere 3_ black box failures (not
ineludtrLI battortes) vhsrs redundancy vas available and operable. 1_ho major
Impact of these failures Is therefore loss of redundancy protection. On
t_|ve spacecraft, hoverer, black bo= failures resulted in severe usisston
Impacts. The_,e are ss follovns:
o Termination of the SA_K mission due to battery failure
o Termination of ths Vtkt_ l_ander 2 mission due to
cuaput • r failure
o Loss of the SEASAT mission due to failure in the array
silt, rtl_ 4ssembly
o L_,ss of the .qMH mission due to co,tsecuttve failures In
all three reaction Heel pour supplies
o Loss of the TIROS-N mission due to failures tt_ both
redundant IHU po_r supplies.
,, Loss _f prtau=ry payload data ,n SNS-I _ue to failure
ot both S-band transmitters
o Loss of primary Payload data dtle t,_ failure of both
VISSR _llcoders on ¢HS-2, GOES-2, and GOES-_
o l_strtctton of prtlutry pa_'load data gathering to real-
ttmv only due to failure oi both primary and redun(lant
tape recorders on LANDSAT 2, NINBLIS-_, and NINBLIS-t_.
1'he impacts of the remainder of the black boK failures tabulated
in EIhthtt I(I fall so_,where betveen the severe ones and loss of redundancy
protection. Tan of these rema|ntnl¢ black ho,= failures inw_lve toss of a
battery; the other 6 loss of s radt_seter.
5. IFII_I
As indicated above, i_I/EH1 ranks as an especially prevalent
end persistent problem area. Of the 43 operating satellites in the update
sample, 22 had IF1/EHI anomalies. The lack of such anomalies on the other
21 spacecraft may reflect lack of reporting rather than lack of such incidents.
Overall, slxty-three anomalles caused by LF1/EMI were identified in the update




































The anomalies represented above include cases of "internal" RFI
where the extent and effects of the RPI vere limited to the "black box" that
generated it, and "external" ILFI where the RPI generated in one ares affected
equipment In another area.
[n making the above allocation of anolalies to equipment areas,
the anomaly was charged to the offending equipment wherever there were
sufficient data to make this assignment. This was clear-cut in cases of
internal RF[. For external RFI, the equipment that was susceptible to RFI
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was charged with the aaoaaly it it appeared that the equipment would not
have been ausceptlble had sore adequate gFI protection been provided. The
equ_Lpment generating the ILFI was charged when it appeared that the magnitude
of the RFI was sufficiently high to penetrate normally adequate R]_I protection
In other equipment. The "Unknown" category includes anomalies where this
distinction could not be made. 14aking these assignments required assumptions
when the data did not specifica1ly identify the offending equipment. These
assumptions were based on engineering Judgment using the descriptions of
the anomalies.
Hsny of the RFI/EMI anomalles did not significantly affect space-
trait per£orsance. Some, however, were serious. In several instances, RFI/EHI
caused significant losses o£ payload data. Also, in at least two instances
the offending equipment had to be turned off and the back-up unite selected,
which resulted in loss of redundancy. Thus, it appears that in design and
testing, the generation of, and susceptibility to, RFI/EHI warrants special
conslderatlon.
6. _p!oysonts
On the spacecraft launches covered in this study sample, but
not including spacecraft already covered in previous studies and updated in
this saaple, there were at least 71 deployment events. These events ranged
frog solar paddle and boom deploylents to extensions of long antennas, but
do not Include separation or deploysents involving slnply the "sprlng-out"
of short stub antennas and the llke.
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For these 71 deployment events, eight enomaltes were reportodo
Of these eight, only one involved • deployunnt fstlure, n_mly, the deployumnt
failure of the 10 smter, Z axis Vector Etectrtc Field Instrument boom on DE-2.
This anomaly was attributed to an open in the power circuit.
The ten•thing 7 deployment anomalies are summarized 88 follows:
o The SAGE S-band antenna required 40 uttnutes to deploy;
attributed to low telperature stiffness of a coaxial cable;
o .'he LANDSAT-3 left solar paddle _td not slew as ezpected
st deployment, possibly due to shadowing of a sun sensor;
o LANDSAT-4 was tnitially unsuccessful in deploying the In-band
antenna-
o On HAGSAT. only I of the 2 desptn tisers functioned; timer
02 never becase armed, possibly due to higher than expected
thermal resistance between the fourth stage and the timer;
o On ND/BUS-7. several squirm on tnatruwnts did not fire
until the firing commnds ware repeated;
o On NOAA-7, an instruwnt earth shield door was slow to deploy.
possibly due to • e_chantcal hang-up;
o The Voyager 2 Science Boos deployed to within 0.06 ° of the
correct posttlon and did not latch; the two uost likely causes
reported are debris in the folding strut hinge or insufficient
drive in the folding strut;
o On Voyager 2, telemetry indicated that the RTG S,>om Release
pyro-aupltfters "A" activated; but not the "B" set of eupltfters;
there _as some evidence that a transistor in the output switching






This subsection discusses four mddltlonal observations of
(I) Self Healln_: The apparent self-heallng capabillty which
has been noted in previous data bank studies was again
observed. In the update sample, there were 14 instances
of anomalous behavlor that cleared up without any type of
intervention. These instances do not Include "glltches"
that occur once or a few times and then go away.
(2) Array Temperature Sensors: During the course of this study.
it appeared that a large number of array temperature sensor
failures were reported. Further analysls revealed that six
such sensors had failed catastrophically, and that these
failures had occurred on HCO/. ATS-6, C,OBS-I, GOES-3, IUE.
and SHS-2.
(3) Plume Impingement: On previous data bank studies, anomalles
_re occasionally noted involvlng impingement of the propulslon
plume on some spacecraft surface. Four such instances were
noted during this study; one each on GO£S-4. GOBS-$. Voyager
I. and Voyager 2. On the Voyagers, this caused 20Z less _V
than was expected, and subsequently more hydraztne use.
It was reported that post-launch analyses based on more
sophisticated techniques than had been applled earller
produced results agreeing with the observed phenomena.
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(4) Probl_-a Corrected/Mitigated from the Ground: On all previous
data bank studies, instances were frequently noted where the
anomaly was corrected or mitigated by some action taken on
the ground. _ring this update, 75 such instances were
identified. These instances include only those where the
anomaly was actually corrected or the anomalous hardware
restored to acceptable status from the ground. They do not
include commanding-ln a redundant unit, co_laudlng the space-
craft back to the proper configuration following spurious
turn-ous/turn-offs by "glitches," nor establishing procedures
to allow some unit to wars-up before use. Even trLth such
exceptions, the number of anomalies corrected or mitigated
from the ground in this sample is significantly larger than
the numbers noted in the past. There appear to be several
reasons for this, one of them being the more extensive use
of on-board computers.
This more extensive use of on-board computers presents more
opportunities for correcting anomalous behavior via on-board
software modifications that change operating points or pro-
cedures. It also increases the likelihood of anomalous
behavior due to software errors. Of the 75 cases where
anomalies were corrected or mltt_ated from the ground.




Typlcally, spacecraft performance begins at (or near) its
design capability immediately after a successful launch and then degrades
over time as it incurs • wide variety of anomalies. A procedure to
quantify spacecraft performance, or capability, over time using the PRC
apace data base was derived in Reference 11.
Each spacecraft anomaly in the data base is assigned to one of
five mission effect categories as described in Section III. The procedure
to quantify spacecraft capability begins by assigning a single numeric to
represent "average" spacecraft degradation in each category as shown below:
Mission Effect
1. Negligible
2. Non-Negligible but Small
3. 1/3 to 2/3 ,_tssion Lost
4. 2/3 to Nearly Total Mission Lost







Thus, spacecraft capability starts at 1.0 and remains there until occurrence of
of the first anomaly, when it is assumed to degrade by exactly the percentage
assigned to its mission effect category. If this value is designated DI, then
at this point in time spacecraft capability is given by (I - DI). Spacecraft
capability is assumed to r_sin at this value until occurrence of the second
anomaly with degradation D2. Spacecraft capability is then assumed to be




(1 - D2). In general, spacecraft capability
(1 - Di)
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Yupon the occurrence of the nth anomaly and remains at this level until the
occurrence of anomaly n ÷ 1. Plotting these results provides a highly
visual indication of the degradation in spacecraft capability over time.
Integrating the resultant curve over the spacecraft's operating (or
design) life and normalizing provides a single numeric representing
average capability.
The procedure, while being easy to apply and useful in some
applications, may not always provide an accurate portrayal of space-
craft performance. It is the purpose of this subsection to examine four
specific reasons why this might be so and to suggest an improved procedure
suitable for general application.
(l) The criticality categories permit the
possibility of large accumulated errors
in the capab_lity estimate particularly
for accumulations of trivial anomalies.
This criticism is particularly apropos for complex, well-
documented spacecraft. A case in point is NIHBUS-7, reported herein. It
has accumulated 53 category 1 anomalies and 8 category 2 anomalies for a
current estimated capability, using the current procedure, of
C - (0,975) 53 (0.8) 8 - 0.044.
The spacecraft in fact is operating quite well in spite of its
61 anomalies, much better than the capability figures of 4.4 percent
would imply. The solution to this problem lles in making a more accurate
assessment of the mission impact of each anomaly and carefully tracking
the cumulative impact of all anomalies. The latter is a good deal easier
than the former. That is, determining the impact of each of the first
ten NIHBUS-7 anclalies is probably at least ten times as difficult as
6O
determining the state of NIMBUS-7 after the tenth anomaly. Careful
application of these two approaches, however should adequately overcome
this drawback.
(2) Assignment of anomalies to the categories
is highly Judgmental _rith no formal rules
for making these assignments.
The informal rule for assigning anomalies to categories is to
establish the overall effect on the mission as if the anomaly had occurred
in isolation and at the beginning of the mission. Anomalies in redundant
units take into account the degree of redundancy available upon their
occurrence. Otherwise this approach does not include cumulative or
cancelling effects of anomalies. While the assignments are Judgmentals
it is fairly easy to make the right assignment because the five categories
are fairly broad and are tailored to the actual results observed in practice.
Furthermere. there is no totally objective way to determine the impact of most
anomalies. TV pictures or communications lit.ks that are degraded or fuzzy or
intermittent, etc., are common anomalies for which this is true. Furthermore,
the apparent objectivity inherent in "40 frames of data lost" or "2
transponders failed," etc., may be more illusory than real, requiring
agreement that all frames/transponders are equal and so on. The impact of
anomalies on acientific missions is generally even more subjective.
One approach to this problem aight be to have an expert (or
experts) assign the anomalies to their mission effect categories and Justify
each assignment, in writing, ou the basis of all available information.
It might also be possible for the expert(s) to prepare ground rules
for anomaly classification and then to review the results for realism.
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(3) The method for coabtnln_ the effects of anceselles
(i.e., as products), while nathematlcallY advan-
tqeoua, appears deficient in descrlbln8 the
_rforsance •
The best way to determine how deficient this method is, is to
compare its appllcatlon vlth the actual curve. But if one had the actual
curve there would be no need to apply the method at all. Thus, deriving
an actual curve, or at least one approachln_ as closely as posslble to
the actual, would obviate this problem.
(4) No distinction is made between engineering
performance and science perforumnce.
Assume that each spacecraft can be rather neatly divided into
two parts. One is the basic bus; the structure, pob_r supply, attitude
control, comm_nlcattons, thermal control, etc.; and the other is the payload,
e.g., multl-spectral sensor, TV cameras, magnetometers, etc. Given this
division, it would be of interest to know how well the bus was performing
(engineering performance) and how well the payload was performing (sclence
performance). It ts entirely posslble, of course, that under particular
scenarios of redundancy, load sharing, snd work-arounds that both bus and
payload could be doing rather poorly _ile the mlssion Itself was being
accompllshed quite s&ttsfactorily. Thus, the distinction between englneerlng
and science performance night best be drawn by making three evaluations
upon the occurrence of each anomaly, i.e., its atsslon effect, its payload
effect, and its effect on the bus.
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An Improved Procedure
Combining these responses into an overall procedure would not only
avoid the four drawbacks discussed above, but would also provide a generally
superior way to assess spacecraft capability as a function of time. Specifi-
cally, the new procedure might consist of the following steps. (I_ Assign
"experts" to implement the procedure for each spacecraft or to review the
results of lore general practitioners. (2) Have the experts and/or
practitioners gain familiarity with the total spacecraft design, mission,
results, and anomalies. (3) Assign to each anomaly three cumulative degrada-
tion factors to the nearest percentage point, one for the ndssion, one for the
payload, and one for the bus.* Since some anomelies have a degradation effect
over time it will probably be useful in most cases to also assign cumulative
degradation factors at some convenient time intervals ouch as every 1000
hours or every quarter. These assignments would be an evaluation by
experts or practitioners of the cumulative capability lost at a given
point in time for the total spacecraft, the bus, and the payload.
(4) Provide a written Justification for each assignment. (5) Plot the
resultant curves and normalize as before.
*Note that it may also be n_,cessary to introduce a factor
to account for self-heali_ and hence improvements in capability.
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We, as practitioners, attempted to apply the procedures to SAGE
(AEH-2), a fairly slmple spacecraft with a fairly straiEhtforward mission
profile. The results _ere not encouraging. Estluustlng the actual impact
of each anomaly has proven to be time consuming, difficult, and ultlmstely
arbitrary In large part. This may be due simply to our lack of in-depth
familiarity with the system and its mission. Real experts operating more
nearly in real time might ease the process considerably and provide more
accurate results.
Our attempt to implement the procedur_ is documented in
Exhibit II. The results for the mission are plotted in Exhibit 12
together with the results of applying the current methodology. It is
assumed in both exhibits that the mission degradation is linear, going
from 50 percent after the battery anomaly (2050 hours) to zero at the end
cf the mission (25,270 hours).
The proposed method gives an average capabillty over the space-
craft's operating life of 54 percent; the current method ylelds 18 percent.
The design 1lie for SAGE is 12 mon_hs. Average capability over this
period is 76Z using the suggested method and 28% using the current method.
The differences are clearly significant. How general this phenomenon
is with respect to other spacecraft is unknown.
The improved procedure is obvlously a good deal more time
consuming than the current one. The difference is almost totally in the
derivation of the :.hree cumulative degradation factors together with the
_rritten Justifications required by the improved procedure. In the
current procedure this is a staple exercise _n multlpllcation. Nhtle it
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detentine how long £t vould take, a rough estimate that leesm reasonsble
to the authors £s 15-30 minutes per anonaly, if the procedure is
implemented at the t£me the F.J_s are generated or by so_o_ uho is
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AYPglqDIX A
DATA BANK COVELqG£ FOR THIS UPDATE
The chart in this appendix llscs the spacecraft for which
Information was added to the data bank by this study.
For each spacecraft, the chart shows the number of the engineering
analyses report (EAR) that backs Lap the data in this report and gives an
indication of the deEree of completeness of the four major cables in Che
EAR. Information for Table UI (parts counts by major components) was not
actively sought in this study and chat for Tables V and VI (developmental
and prelaunch activities) varied from essenClally none to fairly comprehsive.
Informatlon on developmental accivlces, however, was not generally available
from Chose sources that provided the spacecraft operational dace and a
separate collection effort was not undertaken to seek information of thls
kl nd.










This appendix Is divided into three tabulations. Appendix B-1
summarizes each anomaly in the update. Appendix B-2 contains classification
codes for each anomaly using the "standard" approach applied to all previous
collections. Appendix B-3 contains additional classification codes applied
in this study. Sections III.A and III.B in the main body of this report
define the various codes and discuss their application to the spacecraft
anomalies. For convenience, the identification of the anomaly characteristics
and the alpha-numeric codes employed are repeated Just prior to the two
tabulations of Appendices B-2 and B-3.
Appendix B-1 contains, in tabular form, the primary data upo_
which this report fs based. All 606 satellite anowalies are listed by
spacecraft, in order of elapsed time to occurrence and contain these data
elements:
o Time-to-occurrence of anomaly in hours. A time t is
associated wt.th the launch interval, prior to injection
Into orbit. The symbol denotes either unknown time
or intermittent occurrence.
o Three short phrases indicating the description of the
observed anomaly, its suspected or known cause, and the
effect on the mission objective(s).
o Corrective actions, both in-orbit or for subsequent
launches, if known.
o Brief remarks, If needed to place the anomalous
incident in context.




The sequential coding index of colu,a_ I provides a means of cross-
referencing to the classlflcation codes of Appendix B-2 and B-3. These two
appendices should facilitate any further classlflcation or analysls the
reader might wish to undertake.
Appendix B-I begins on Page 83. Appendix B-2 on Page 155. and
B-3 on page 175. A llst of acronyms used in the anoaaly summaries and
















































Advanced Very _Ltgh l_esolution Radiometer
Bent Crystal Spectrometer
Beginning of Tape
Command and Data Handling
Command and Data Acquisition






Coastal Zone Color Scanner
Data Acquisition and Processing Unit




Digital Solar Aspect Sensor
Vlgltal Tape Recorder
ERTS Command Auxiliary Nemory
Earth Radiation Budget
Earch Sensor Assembly
Electrically Scanning Microwave Radiometer
Flat Crystal Spectrometer
Gas Chromatograph ._iass Spectrometer
Software
High Altitude Observatory
High Data Rate Storage System
High Energy Particle Detector
High Energy Telescope
High Resolution Infrared Sounder
High Resolution Infrared Radiometer
Image Dissector Camera
Inertial Neaeurement Unit
Low Altitude Plasma Experiment
Limb Infrared Monitoring of the Stratosphere
Left Solar Array Drive
































































Rotary Variable Differential Transformer
Solar Array Drive
Stratospheric Aerosol _easurement II
Stratospheric and Hesopheric Sounder
Synthetic Aperture Radar
Scatterometer




Scanning Hultichaunel Hicrowave Radiometer
Signal to Noise Ratio
Scanning Radiometer
Scanning Radiometer Recorder






Total Ozone _lapping Spectrometer
Tropical Winds Energy Conversion Reference Level
Experiment
TWT Amplifier
Visable Infrared Spin Scan Radiometer Atmospheric
Sounder
Vecto_ Electric Field Instrument
Very High Resolution Radiometer
Versatile Information Processor
Visable and Infrared Radiometer
Vlsable Infrared Spin Scan Radiometer
Vertical Temperature Profile Radiometer
Wide Band Video Tape Recorder
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i N_NALOUS IHCID_(T CLASSIFICA_IOm CODES, STANDARD APPROACH
I. Hiss/on Subset c. Paver Supply
U. Unsuccessful Launch d. A_titWJe Control and
Stlbillsat
S. Spacecraft vith No
- AnonslLes Eepoz_ed dt Propulsion
Spacecraft vith e. EnvLrounental Control
F Anomal/es Reported
. f. Structure
11. Y_tssion Tern S. Payload (Experimental
L. Tern and Scientific)Long
S. Short Tern h. Unknovn
IlI. NLsalon Phase VZ. A. ,Incident Type
L. Launch and Acquisition E. Electrical
O. Orbital (Steady-State) M. Mechanical
IV. _Ltssion Effect
....... Ira. B. Incident Type
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This appendSx presents spacecraft and major spacecraft subsystem
performance summaries in graphlcal form. Appendix C-I contains one chart
per spacecraft, although some charts run to two or even three pages. Each
chart identifies all of the spacecraft's subsystems and payloads. It
further identifies each anomalous component within the subsystem or pay-
load. All anomalies are identified on the chart at the time they occurred.
Those that caused complete failure of the associated component are denoted
by a clrcle; all others by trlangles. Anomaly indications in the "Unknown
Time of Occurrence" column are of essentlally negliglble mission effect
and occur at some undocumented time(s) or are present throughout the
mission. Survlval times are also given for each subsystem and anomalous
component. When an anomalous component is redundant, the survival times
ar,_ given for the redundant units even if they hsve no anomalies. Other
components without anomalies are not listed.
Appendix C-2 arrays significant anomalies and failures by major
spacecraft subsystems. Since each program has a somewhat different
breakout of subsystems, we have standardized on the eight defined in sub-
section III.A.5. In addition to being ordered by subsystem rather than
spacecraft, this appendix differs from Appendix C-! in two ways. First,
only "significant" anomalies are included. These are generally those
categorized as having a mission effect code of 2 or greater (see subsection
III.A.4) although all anomalles in redundant units, whose mission effect
is negllgible because of the redundancy, are also included. The second
191
major difference is that time, rather than being plotted in hours as in
Appendix C-l, is plotted in teras of spacecraft design llfe. For the
uaJor subsystems (Timing, Control and Command; Telemetry and Data Xandllng;
Pover Supply; Attitude Control and Stabilizatlon; and Payload) an entry is
made for each spacecraft whether or not it had significant anomalles in
the svbJect subsystem. Note that an entry of "No significant anoa_lies"
means on that subsystem only. The Structure subsystem does not appear
since there were no significant anomalies in this subsystem in this update.
Furthermore, for the Propulsion and the Environmental Control subsystems
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O indicates that this anomaly is a failure, where failure is defined as the event that renders the subsystem end/or
component unusable•
/_ indicates that _his anomaly is not a failure.
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Indicates that this anomaly 18 • failure, where fellure is defined as the event that renders the subsystem end/or
co_ponent unusable.
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O indicates that that this anomaly is a failure, vhere failure Is define_- as the event that renders the subsystem
and/or the component unusable.
/_ indicates that this anomaly is not a failure•
_/ g_ttery capacity started to degrade at 2050 hours and failed completely at 25,270 hours•
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oRIGiNAL pAGE IS





































Olndlcltes that this mnoma_,v l$ a failure0 where failure Is defined is th_ event that renders the aubsvste| end_or
c t-_', one_ t ,.musab l e.












































A indicates that this InoSg]v Is I failure, _here failure Is defined aa the event that render, the luhsvst#_ and 'rrcomponent tmussbJe.
indicates that t tm ono1_Jlv iS not • feiJure.
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L A_J
PF.RFORNA.qCE SL_HARY FOR ATS-$
_ Time of OccurrenceSubsystem and (Hours from Launch)
- ,..1o. Co=_ent<.)L..nc, lO lO0 lO00 1OOOOi iI
o Structural L_immmmm_mmmmmmm m mmmmmm,mlnmenmmmmeqmi, m.m.mmu_.!
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I-o . "mmmmmmml NNNE_.
Oem I INn Life: : :
26.280 hr,_r s : Fnd of Data:
(3 'fears) : 99.73- hours:
• end of report
stud", period--
ATS- _) underwent
end-of- 1[ fe test_.
..o
Olndlcate| that this an_l_ is a failure, vhere failure Ja defined as the event that renders the subsystem and/or
c o_p_n_n t unuoeble.
A l._ta,o, ,h,,t.l, anom._,_, .o__,, failure. 200
ORIGINAL pAGE
OF POOR QUALITY


















































indicates that this en(_elv is s fellL_re, where failure is defined ms the event thee renders the sube*'Jtem and or
cotewooent t_umshls.
Indicates that thll anomaly Is not a failure.
I SP r_ " Speaecs'sft- rrop_u]slnn ,Suhsvslesi,
201
| .J




















tndicste* tti'_t this inol.)_ ta • fli|ure, vhere fli|ure || defined ss the event ths! !endell the luhl,stem snd _'r
_t-_p_nent Ufl_S&b|e.
Indtcsts_ ths! this e_r, sla|_ ts no! s fe$|ute.
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17.S20 houvm End of Date:
(2 _eere_ kS,)60 hourm;
ATS-b lielton terminated.
LeJLe_d
Indicate* thal th|s anmMlv le • failure. _heye fail_tr is defined as the event that yendeye the lub_ item end 'of
cc_ilpo_ent u_ueeble,
_ indl, etes that thi_ an_l_" im not i failure.
_/ UCSP - ttntvereitv of Callforflta. San Ne8 o.
)/ UCL4 - U_tve_oits of Cellfnr_ia, Io0 _mleleu.
VTIRR - Very llilh blot.tto_ Pdldi_tet.
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." Pls_ Wave Instru-
ment with Stub Boom
Assembl)
o High Altitude Plasma
Instrument
o Retirdin_ Ion _ls
Spectrometer
o Spin Scan Auroral
Ima_er























8.690 hours; iend of report
etJdy period--
DE-I Is still











O lndicetes that thii anol-ly is 8 failure, ,*here failure is defined aa the event that renders the euba:,'stel and/or
c om!ponent unusable.
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Lndhatei that thh anomaly is • failure, where failure Is defined I8 the event that renders the lublyltem and/or
C oIponent unusable.





• leo Drift lister







































O Indicates tkat this anomaly So • fdllure, vhere f011ure 18 defined ms the eveBt tkat fenders the 8ubsystel and/or
coa_o, ent umueable.
lndScetes that th£s anols17 Is no..._t• failure.
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is cn •t•ndby •tatus.
indicates that this •nomely 1• • failure, vhere failure 1• defined aS the event that renders the subsystem and/or
component unusable.
indicates that this •nogusly 18 not a failure•
1/ The •peace boost motor Is a one-shot device and has a normal lifetime of 2_ hours
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O indicates that this enomely Is a failure, vhere failure is defined sa the event that renders the subsystem and/or
component unusable.
indicates that this anomaly is not • failure.
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Ejection Heehanlaml/
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S-Band Transmitter



































"ms mm re'ms mm m ml| m ms s m m' umsm 'smemsmmsmmms i :




Mmmmmmmml mmmmmmmmm immmmmmm_. }




.......i Im sm amlilmmlmm )immmmmmmmme _ _l
$
i







O tndicstes that this anomaly Is a fai:ure, where failure Is defined as the event that renders the subsystem and/or
component unusable.
indicates that this anomaly ls not s fsllure.
1/ The apogee boost motor end ejection aechanism is s one-shot device end has s noz..'_al lifetiM of 24 hours.
3/ STDN -Spsceflight Tracking end Dsts Network.
_/ CDA • Cosmand and Data Acquisition.
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3/ DCP - D_tm Cc,]lectlo_ Pjmtlor+
_/ l_P_ - HII_ L_tl_ PsrtS¢le l)etect_ P.
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lhdlcltes thor this Imolm|v Is • fslIure. V_ere follure I0 defied el Ih_ ev_m_t thll rlmdero the LJblvslee Imd/oc
co,peyotl uvtvseble
/% lndlrltel that this gmOl_|9 IS rot I follure.
I/ _ epolee boost u_tor Ind e)ect|o_ lech_iJ•h |• j none-s_et device end _8s • nor'_bJl lifetime of _6 hours
/ bCP - Dell Col|eclI_ P|llfore
)' NIP@ * Milk [nerl_ Particle D_te(t(,_
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l_c';cstes that thls et_Olt_l_ Is 8 failure, where failure is defined as the event that renders the Subs_s'er 4_ ¢'_
c olq_one _ t unusable
_k |n_icate$ thet this enclt•l_ IS no,! • (81|ure.
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o LnerEetic Electrons &
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Experiment

















































Iril In ! .
_Qnd:
indicates thil this in•lily i• • failure, I_•re failure to defined 08 the event thai renders the subs, stir and/or
c olpO_in I _liabll.
Indlcitel thll ills lltlly Is rot s failure.
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O indicates that this enoma]_' is a failure, tMhere failure is defined am the event that renders the •
( •aperient unveab |i,,
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lndlcstps thor this sneullv l! • dSllure. _r, foilure is defined st the event thet renders the eubs_ote_ snd,,,t
¢o_monen t unussble.
















O lndicliel thil this inolllv Is I failure, vipers failure ie defined is the event that tendeys the subsystem and or
_ne_t unusibie.
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O indicates lhat this anomaly is • failure, _ere failure is dofiRed is the event that rend/to the lubiviliP and cr
colohenl unusable.
/% indicates that this anoltaly IO no_t S failure.
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Oindlcitee that this i'_cily tee failure, vhere failure Is defined am tl_ ever.t that rendtro the oub|yetel andloi
c o_poner t ununble.
indicates that this Inoos|y Is no_t ,I failure. 220
_d
Oin•_i_tes that this dan_a_ls Is j failure, _eye failu[e as defineJ ae the event thee renders tl_ |ubessterr an, * ,'s
c Ollt,,-nen t unusable
In_l,etes that this In_'_l_ IS n_,t a fell_._te
I_ It_l_ * IRIS Cosign d Ausllter_ ICeek, t_
















Indicates tell this an•lily Is • flllure, vlure failure le dlo|l_nd 8• the •_lnt that Irlndet8 the 8uboy•t•n and/or
c:oIt)onen I unullbl• •
A Indicates thai this •nommly Is no,. • f•llute,
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indl:etes that this enomlly Is a failure, vhere failure Is defines as the event that renders the eubs.vste_ end,','r
coe:.ponen: unusable.
/_ indl:ates that this sno_]y Is no__t • _ailure.
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T/he of Occurrence Tiae of












indicates that this onmtlly is a failure, vhere failure is defined as the event that renders the $ubs_'ste_ a_'cr
co_ponent unusable.
Indicates that this _no_aly is r___t s failure
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_lllllllllllll II llllll lllll_|llll.
.-- .... ------- ...... -_--_,--:-----"'i.. _
e
|llllllllllllllllllllllll lll+| l lJl
fllluye where fll|ure I_ dot 1ned l_ the evenl t hat tendert the SUbt' ste_ l_:indlclte$ h:: thls is
Lom_o_er,: u_usl_(
_lndac•tes thst thlS •n_]_ iS no_ • (ll)uYe
l, _ - S_lt Att•_ Dt_ve.
_,' H_SS " HI_ bill Rite Storage S_ste-
_, 1_15 " |n|rlte_ |nletfeto_m_teI Spectrometer
• _ Iq'J$! -Mor, ilot t'lty_vlolet Sc:*r Enet_. 225
_/_ _ / r




0 l_dlcates that this anosa]y is I failure. ,where failure _s c_flned as the event that re_rs the lubsyste_ and/or
c Oll_Ot_n I ur_uaab It •
indicates tha_ thll anc_al_ is ne_!_- faLJure.
_,' ZIU, S l lntertolat*on lacordln8 Location Sylta_.
_/ _C_ l Selective Chopper _dl_ter.
_ Il_% - lackscatter _ltrav_olet-



























































iII I II II elllim |ii lllilmllll a )i llel I im | _im| llllmii lllllmillim iiiiiIiiiII{
, .
Ilm HI am Im II is IIIIm Im El amII Imlll/lll Hi il amml III II I1_ Imil
ilmllllmlll BIImUNImI Ill imm m m lllm Iiii ii m Imim iiiii m im iiiiiiii{
immmmmmnIImiImmIlIiImImI#mImIm_' _ . mmIimi_:,
! ! i : •
...... ...... -.-----..,..........





Indicates that thls lnOlli_ iS I failure, w_ere failure is defined Is the event t)_l! renders the full, Item' I_d
_lndltltel {hit _hll IflOl.I]_ |1 nnt • |lllure
L_kno_
_S
Tf, cr; s_c ,_i ,--
OTCTm_I"
_/ I_)R$5 - Nllh Darn Rate Sters_e $4"etew
_r|P " vers•tile T_forl_tlon Process ,r.
227
I_ r .... _:I_: p ......... _._ .-_
















O lndicate• thee th$• anomm)_ Is a failure, v_ete failure |* defined II the event teat t_ oubsv_tee and/oy
CC_l_,C_eflt Ul_Uaable.
lndlcetea that this eno_s_,l_ I• not • failure
l/ tS._ * Electrically Scanned _lcr_ave hdio_teter
]/ |TPI - l_frered Temperature Profile gadios_ter
_/ NI.H$ e N$obuo-I Rlcrovave Spectrc,_ter

















Launch I0 I00 1000 10000 iOuO00| L l 31 i
mnm_i__ ini_ " "" iiBm_ Z i_
...-- .....-- .--,... .....+., !mmi_:
_..... -- _- • ..__
L. .L ._- .L -+._- :
! l l / :t •/ / :i •
I I I I :I .._ .:_
_mmmimmmejmmmmmmmOmimmimm4mmimimq_Om_ _ :
• i _ v •
i _ l l |, .:
" i
Des/In Life: : |
8.760 hours







@l_d;_stes that this anoma;)" Is a failure, vhere failure Is dafsned as the event that renders the subsyste_ s_/cr
i_;:s_es that this snoBal_' is n_._tt e failure.
; _¢F o Se2e.:;v* Chopper ladlo=4¢er.
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8.760 hours E_d of Data:
(I Years 62,$39 hours, e_: :
reprri stud' De:_" --
indicates that this lnolelk el I failure, where fllJUY@ iS defined Is the event that rendtr_ the suhl_*ter sed cr
colponent u_useFle.
indicates that tell lhOIa)_ IS not I feJl*_re













IlIIIII _1 IIII IlIi IIIl_II .I_11 III1_
/ I/ i
iIIIIIIIIIIIIIII IIIlIIIiIIIIl_IiIIIIII.
• , i i "
_------*_---4----'"_.
$






G indicates thee this ino,ul]_ is a failure, vhere fiilure is defined I| the event that the IU_F,'_ t e_e @r
CO: -,_nant u_nuaable.
_indicotes that this ano_a|v is no_._ta failure.
I' ESuR - [lectricallv Scanned Hicre_ave Radiometer.
_' _ - [,arth Radiation BudMet
_ LR:_ - Limb Radiance Inversion Radiometer.
Td[RL[ - _ropicxl Vind. [nerE_. Conservation end Reference Level Experiment.
_' TF!I_ * Temverature/Humldit_ Infrared Radiometer.
6 D_A _ " DiIita! Solar Aspec[ Sensor.
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o Ca_ond end Date
Interface t_lt












































o_d of report etud_
still operstlnf.
in, looses that thai ano4_lv Is s failure, t_hsre fii|uYO Is def|nod el the erect _hst renders the sube_Jte_ end ',,r
cOOponent unusable.









































O indicates failure, vhere failure is defined as the event that renders the subs_st_that this &hOme ly is 8
¢olmponent unusable.





O indicates that this a_omal_' is • |811ure, vhere re.luTe IS defined as the event that renders the lubsylt er.l end/or
component unusab}e.
indicates that this anomaly _[S no._t I _lllure.
l/ V_R_ - Vet} Hllh Resolution Radiometer
./ %_P_ • vertical lesperature Profi]e Radiometer
2 S_ " Scennln8 Radlo_ter.
Subsystem sad






































Olndlcatas that this mnomaly 18 a fal)ure, vhere failure is defined as the event that renders the lub_',•ste_ and/or
c ompo_ent unusable.
indicates that this Inoualy ls not j failure.
_/ _ • Very Mi|h Reso|ution tadio_tar.
t/ VTPR - Vertical Tenlpereture Profi;e _adiometer.
















o APoSee Boost _tor_ /
































end of report stud_
period; 1OOAA-b is
still operstLn_.
Olndlcites that this anomaly Is i failure. _ere failure Is defined is the event that remdero the ouboyste_n end/or
c olponent unusable.
/% Indicates that this anomaly IS no.__t I failure.



































emd of report •tudy
I_tlod--_-6 ls
still opetsttn8.
Indicates that this smomsly 18 • failure, vher8 fel]ur8 Is defSned me the event that renders the subsystem and/or
component unu•abla.
/% indicates that thi• anomaly is no_..tt • failure.
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indicates that this anomaly 1• a failure, v_ere failure la defined as the event that ran#ere the subs)stem and/or
coliponent unusable.
/% indicates that this anomaly Is not • failure.
_ The epolte booer cater le I one-shot device and has • normal lifetime of 2_ hours.
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illllPily 8 t ill lind
imoiilouil C=lpoei_n tm)
(Pliyi old. c ol_t I e,_,ll )
o ILtlitl Illilo_,utic, r.




llOill 1 i OT
l_St ru_eni PlaCioT_
$,mahad,r
PEIl_OIL.i,liJ_('l $Llllili_ FOil NOA#t-"







end of 1epOTt ltu_',









lie I I lr _*l_t
I T. %.'t' h<,_J i I.
t.' _ltlIi I _
"i 1rail of





















R4ea¢ t i o_.. be_ee 1
As_,_ ly--P1t ch

























lndlcetes thor thls Inamuly Is I fellure. IPhere failure Is deflned Is the event .hit timdirl the eubs_.stee end/er
c lo'_n I uflulllb 1e.
_lndlcete. that thls Imolil|y Is no..It i feilure.












lndl_41tss thllt thls In_YlI]_ Is I failure vheye failure 4,. ue(ine(_ IS tl_ 4lveml that rln4¢ts tlll luhsxste" I +,`+ t
indicates thal this lnolllls Is ne__ I llllUte
F- -$_'k_C-'_ _'_--a.dat ",_ TiPlellet T, lind [olillne COll_,.nl, nt I,
. Ol( " O_-|oal+ Computer










o q_lWe Ikx_t _tor_ I/
• Pouer






























O lndlcate• that this &no_J]y is • failure, vt_ere failure Is defined es the event that renders the subsystem and,or
cOlu_or_nt unusable,
Indicate• that this anoma]y 1• no.__t • failure.
J,' The s_cjt( bo._t Bot_r 1• • one-•hot device and Ms 8 i_orsm] lifetioe of 2& heurs,















tndicat,s that this •nosily is a fmtluTe, vhere fmJlure 1o aedafine_ the even_ that renders the
ouhJyJt qP_ c,y
_ o41_,o_e_ t vmusable.
/% Indi_atal that thai ahOIdl)y Jl ho_ a fa|Iure.
II The apolce boil[ IOtOY SS a ofl,-oh_! device 4,d hal • norla| |if•title Of _. houri.







































o Aposee Boost Notor _/
4
/.munch !0





























O Indicates that this anolJly Is a failure, where failure is defined as the event thee tenders the auhs,'|tee end/or
co.anent unuaable.
indicates that this anotw]y la not a fal)ure
I/ The apoaee boost motor le• O,_e-Snot device and has • norms) lifetime of 24 hours.
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Indicates fillure Is defined is the event that renders the eub_iter in_r-'Tthat this InOIMl y IS e failure. vhere
c o_onant unusable.
Indicates that this Inoliliy %1 no_it I failure,
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Ir_d of Dill:















i t._b( _ h,,ui_
/% I
_ 1i _'Jl___
0 lfldl,llii Ihil thll Inomll_ II • fll|u e. Ihete IIIlure is defi_ed is the evl_l Ihll re_ders the lubl, lte- i-,' ,'i
i ¢llo_/nl u_lOlble •!
I_dl_ilel thll Ihll I,,_ll.il_ II _Ol • #llhlll
___1







OF PooR QUALI_,., ,,,
2_,7



































llkln I Orbiter 1
deecttVlled.
indicates failure lI defimJd el the event that rndevo the subsystem end/orthll lhll lhOII I y le I IIIIuYl, q_hete
( oeponent unuseble.
































indicates that this 8nosmly is a fat!ere, vhere failure Is defined as the event that renders the eubsysteu and/or
couponent unusable.
































































































O Indicates vhete failure le defined as the event that renders the subsysteo and/orthat this 8n(Nha I y 8s failure,e
coa_onent u_ueable.
/% indicates that this anomaly is not 8 failure.










indicates that th_s anomaly is • failure, where failure is defined as the event that renders the 8ubsyste_ and crcompo ent unusable,











































































VSkln 8 Orbiter 11 yam
8dmtdotm due to
dlepletlon of ItS.
indicate8 thee this anolm|y Is • fa$|ure, vhere fmllure le defined as the event that renderi the IubSyIttI and/or
coupohent tIuelh|e.
/% tndteetao that thSa ano_mly to mo_t • failure.
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_dwyM sad














































V:lLkln8 0Tblter 11 was
ehutdovn due tc
depletlo_ of 8as.
0 1_dlcates tha: :his amomsly Is a failure, where failure is dk_f:J_d as the _t that tendeTs the oubsystem a_ o:
c_._ent unusab 1_




































































indicetes thor this dmomo]y is • folluye. _here foiluY• lo d_fiwed el ttu event thor ,oeAJ_ro tow ouboyetem or.d/or
C o_ov_nt u_u_lble.










Iqass Spec trome ter
o llet eor sissy
last rumm_t System
lamKh
_ flSMJ_ Pm V_L_I_ LAdmO 2











O lkndlcstos that this amomJly is • follu_e. _here fellure is defi_ed so the ev_t thet r_rs tim 8_b0yste_ _d/or
component _,_ble.
























• Nodulet io_ /








































































































| _J1d O| DOLl:
$ 6),9Z2 I_ure.
| Voyilet I 1* •tl])
spot et In S .
indlrotes that thl• omooo]y le• flllure, where fillers i0 defl_ed l• the event thor tinders thl oubllvet em
cel_,onelsl _lluooble.






























_ INIOIAI_ IPW, 1QII_ I
(Cmt 1mo4)
TJam of Occurreoco




























_lhdlcmteo that thie mmJo_ly Io _ot • fil|uto
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Deeip Life: hd of kto:
26.200 lasers 66.296 bouts;
(3 Tears) VoYoser 2 is still
egeratio8.
O iedicstei that this ouommly 1o • failure, vhere failure is deffJJed me the evqmt trust feeders the ovboyJtem end/or
coupou_t ueueablo.
indiceles that this onoumly is mo._t • failure.




































Sll_C t rome(aT •rid
Radicoeter
idJumch


































































































roy•oar 2 le 8t111
ogar•tinl.
dicot•e thor this m_ly i• • fiilurl, vhere failure 18 defLnod o• the grant that rndere the ovbeyatim and/or
c oloo_n t unuMhle.
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